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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON LIFE
SUPPORT: FISHER V. UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AND THE
END OF NOT-SO-STRICT SCRUTINY
JONATHAN W. RASH
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the Supreme Court is
obliged to opine once again on the constitutionality of affirmative
action in higher education. While the potential outcome of this case is
nearly impossible to predict, insight into how the Court might decide
Fisher can be found in an unlikely place. Twenty years ago, the Court
decided a case that in almost every way has nothing to do with
affirmative action, but in one important respect is conveniently
illustrative of the path the Court might choose to take.
2
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court chose to resolve the
fate of a constitutionally embattled, politically charged principle: that
the Constitution protects the right to have an abortion. In a nowfamous opinion, the Court averted the extreme path of disavowing
the abortion right and opted instead for a more moderate approach—
3
it reaffirmed the core of the right, but significantly altered the
4
doctrinal rules insulating it. This term, the Court faces a similar task,
and will likely take a similar path. In Fisher, the Court is confronted
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thank Andrew Hand, Aaron Johnson, Matt Waldrop, Patrick Jamieson, Elisa Sielski, and Sitara
Witanachchi for their helpful comments and edits.
1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012). Justice Kagan
is recused from this case, and a four-to-four split at the Supreme Court would result in the lower
court opinion being affirmed. Because the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of UT on all relevant
issues, any decision reversing any of the Fifth Circuit’s holding will require at least five votes.
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. See id. at 846 (reaffirming “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade” that the Constitution
protects a woman’s right to have an abortion).
4. See, e.g., id. at 873 (rejecting the trimester framework, which the Court endorsed in
Roe, but which was not “part of the essential holding of Roe”).
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with a case that could potentially spell the end of affirmative action in
higher education. As it did in Casey, the Court seems likely to sidestep
the extreme route, this time by reaffirming the constitutional validity
of affirmative action, while recalibrating, and making more rigorous,
the rules by which race-conscious admissions policies must abide.
The specific question in Fisher is whether the University of Texas
at Austin’s (UT) use of race as a factor in admissions is
5
constitutionally permissible. UT modeled its admissions policy after
that of the University of Michigan Law School, which the Court
6
approved nearly a decade ago in Grutter v. Bollinger. Because Grutter
7
left much to be desired by way of a workable analytical framework,
8
Fisher is likely to focus just as much on clarifying (or “gutting” )
Grutter as on using it as a basis of decision. Accordingly, this
commentary focuses on how the Court could use this case to rework
Grutter, and on the potential impact of a Grutter makeover on UT’s
use of race in admissions. In the end, just as abortion survived Casey,
affirmative action in higher education probably will survive Fisher—
9
at least in theory. The Court is likely to uphold Grutter’s central
teaching—that the Constitution permits narrowly tailored affirmative
action policies—while striking down UT’s idiosyncratic use of race.
Doing so will require a nuanced analysis, to say the least.

5. Brief for the Petitioner at i, Fisher, No. 11-345 (U.S. Sept. 19, 2011).
6. 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see infra, notes 59–77 and accompanying text (discussing Grutter).
7. See Libby Huskey, Note, Constitutional Law—Affirmative Action in Higher
Education—Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), 4
WYO. L. REV. 439, 473–76 (2004) (arguing that the Grutter decision would have been less murky
if the Court had applied intermediate scrutiny); Mark T. Terrell, Bucking Grutter: Why Critical
Mass Should Be Thrown Off the Affirmative Action Horse, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 233, 234
(2011) (arguing that Grutter’s “critical mass is too illusory to be a useful doctrinal tool”). See
generally Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas:
An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 437 (2011) (criticizing Grutter).
8. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, Fisher, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012)
(Sotomayor, J.) (“So you don’t want to overrule Grutter, you just want to gut it.”).
9. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: Will Grutter be reshaped?, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 10, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=153589 (noting that “[a]ffirmative
action is alive” but that Grutter “may have to be reshaped in order to survive”); Jeffrey Toobin,
At the Supreme Court, A Timid Defense, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/10/affirmative-action-supremecourt.html (concluding that even though affirmative action is in a “perilous state,” it will
probably “survive in some form or another”).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Abigail Fisher, a white Texas resident, was denied
10
undergraduate admission to UT in 2008. She then filed suit, alleging
that UT’s use of race as a factor in admissions violates the Equal
11
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. History of UT’s Admissions Policies
Until 1996, UT made admissions decisions using two metrics: the
12
“Academic Index” (AI) and the applicant’s race. The AI, which is
still employed today, is a composite score based on the applicant’s
high school class rank, standardized test scores, and the rigor of the
13
applicant’s high school curriculum. Between 1989 and 1995, black
and Hispanic enrollment hovered around twenty percent under this
14
policy.
In 1997, UT altered its admissions policy to comply with
15
Hopwood v. Texas, a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, which invalidated the use of race in admissions at UT’s
law school and held that diversity in higher education was not a
16
compelling government interest. Consequently, UT replaced the race
factor with the “Personal Achievement Index” (PAI), which was (and
still is) used with the AI “to identify and reward students whose merit
as applicants was not adequately reflected by their class rank and test
17
scores.” The PAI was designed to increase minority enrollment by
18
accounting for factors that could serve as proxies for race. The PAI is
based on three scores: one for each of two essays and a separate

10. Another applicant, former co-plaintiff Rachel Michalewicz, is no longer party to this
case. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at ii.
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.”).
12. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Tex. 2009),
aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
13. Id. at 596.
14. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 222 n.47 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“Minority enrollment was fairly consistent from 1989 until 1993, with some slight decreases in
1994 and 1995.” (citations omitted)), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 113345). During this time race “was often a controlling factor in admission.” See id. at 223.
15. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
16. Id. at 944–48.
17. Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
18. See id. at 591–92 (explaining that factors such as “socio-economic status of the
student’s family, languages other than English spoken at home, and whether the student lives in
a single-parent household” disproportionately affect minority candidates).
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19

“personal achievement score.” The personal achievement score is
based on several “soft” factors, such as leadership experience, awards
and honors, work experience, community circumstances, and a
20
number of “special circumstances.” The special circumstances
element includes socioeconomic status, family status, and
standardized test scores compared to the average in the applicant’s
21
high school. As a result of substituting the PAI for race, combined
black and Hispanic enrollment dropped from 18.6% in 1996 to 15.3%
22
in 1997.
Later that year, in its own response to Hopwood, the Texas
23
legislature passed what became known as the Top Ten Percent Law,
under which all Texas seniors graduating in the top ten percent of
24
their high school class are guaranteed admission to UT. Because
Texas high schools remain highly segregated, the Top Ten Percent
25
Law succeeded at increasing minority enrollment. By 2004—the last
year before UT implemented its current policy—black and Hispanic
26
enrollment reached 21.4%, returning UT to pre-Hopwood diversity
levels without the explicit use of racial preferences. Then, in 2003, in
27
response to the Supreme Court decision in Grutter, UT decided to
28
reintroduce race as a minor factor in admissions.

19. Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 227–28.
20. Id. The applicant’s race became a “special circumstance” in 2003. See infra note 34 and
accompanying text.
21. Id. UT also attempted to increase minority enrollment with targeted scholarship
programs, focused outreach in underrepresented areas, and additional recruiting at
underperforming schools. Id. at 592.
22. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 3–4; see also Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 224
(expressing the change in total-number terms).
23. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.803 (West 2012) (requiring that public universities admit
in-state students that graduate in the top ten percent of their high school class); accord Fisher II,
631 F.3d at 224 (“The Top Ten Percent Law did not by its terms admit students on the basis of
race, but underrepresented minorities were its announced target and their admission a large, if
not primary, purpose.”).
24. TEX. EDUC. CODE at § 51.803(a).
25. See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 224 (“[T]he Top Ten Percent Law [increased] minority
enrollment . . . .”).
26. Id. at 223.
27. See infra notes 59–77 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court’s decision in
Grutter).
28. See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 224 (discussing studies that were used in UT’s proposal to
reintroduce race as an admissions factor).
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B. Race as a Factor in UT’s Current Policy
UT sought to model its current admissions policy after the one
29
approved in Grutter. Applicants are now divided into three pools: (1)
Texas residents, (2) domestic non-Texas residents, and (3)
30
international students. Applicants compete only against other
31
applicants in their respective pool. Texas residents are further
divided into two subgroups: (a) those in the top ten percent of their
32
high school class and (b) those outside the top ten percent. Non-top
ten percent Texas residents, such as Abigail Fisher, are evaluated on
33
the basis of their AI and PAI scores.
Unlike in UT’s previous policy, race is now a special circumstance
that can be a plus factor in an applicant’s personal achievement score,
which remains part of the PAI. None of the personal achievement
score factors, including race, is given a numerical value, nor is any one
34
factor dispositive to the admission decision. Race “can positively
impact applicants of all races, including Caucasian[s], or it may have
35
no impact whatsoever.”
Some applicants are accepted based on their AI score alone, but
36
no applicant is denied solely on that basis. The AI and PAI scores of
all non-top ten percent applicants are plotted on a grid, one on each
axis. A staircase-shaped cutoff line is drawn, and all applicants in the
37
included cells are admitted. Because race is considered only as part
of the PAI score, it has no direct bearing on where the cutoff line is
drawn. For purposes of admission to UT, the AI and PAI scores are
relevant only for non-top ten percent applicants; but admission to
particular majors is still determined by the AI and PAI scores, making
29. See id. (recognizing that UT had “one eye on Grutter” when developing its current
race-conscious admissions policy); id. at 247 (noting that the UT policy is “in some respects
superior” to the Grutter plan).
30. Id. at 227.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 228–29 (explaining that race is only one of many factors used in the context
of a holistic review).
35. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (W.D. Tex. 2009),
aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
36. Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 227 (“If an application is presumptively denied [due to a low AI
score], senior admission staff review the file [before making a final admissions decision].”).
37. The position of the cutoff line varies from major to major. Id. at 229. “Relatively
rarely,” after a review of the entire file, UT admits applicants whose scores fall below the
official cutoff. See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
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38

race, to some extent, a factor for everyone.
In stark contrast to UT’s pre-Hopwood use of race—where it was
“often a controlling factor”—race is now merely “a factor of a factor
39
of a factor of a factor.” Thus, the number of applicants for which race
40
is decisive is arguably negligible. An applicant with the highest
possible personal achievement score will still be denied admission, for
41
example, if her AI and essay scores are too low.
UT does not monitor the racial makeup of the class during the
admissions cycle, and it does not set numerical targets for minority
42
enrollment. UT reviews its current policy “formally” every five years
and “informally” every year, in order “to assess whether consideration
of an applicant’s race [continues to be] necessary in order to create a
43
diverse student body.”
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Analytical Framework
44

Government-sponsored affirmative action plans are subject to
45
strict scrutiny, the most exacting standard of judicial review. Strict
scrutiny mandates that racial classifications be narrowly tailored to

38. Top Ten Percent Law applicants are guaranteed admission only to the University, not
to the program or school of their choice. If these applicants do not receive admission to their
first choice program, they compete for admission on the basis of their AI and PAI scores. “Top
ten percent applicants not admitted to either their first- or second-choice program are
automatically admitted as Liberal Arts Undeclared majors.” Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 229; see also
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 8 (“[R]ace is a factor in admission, placement, or both
for every in-state undergraduate applicant.”).
39. See Brief for the Respondent at 13, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S.
Sept. 19, 2011) (quoting Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608).
40. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that race has affected 0.5% of
the student body as a whole). But see Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 14
(“[A]lthough petitioner claims that the consideration of race in holistic admissions has had an
‘infinitesimal’ impact on diversity at UT, the record shows otherwise.”).
41. Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 228–29 (citing Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 608).
42. Id. at 230.
43. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 8 (citations omitted).
44. Because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state-sponsored action, the entity
doing the discriminating must be either a state actor or a private actor acting with the
imprimatur of the state. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)
(holding that the injury “did not constitute state action and hence was not subject to judicial
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment”).
45. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720
(2007) (reaffirming that affirmative action plans in education are reviewed under strict
scrutiny); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
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46

achieve a compelling government interest, regardless of the race of
47
the person advantaged or disadvantaged by the plan. The Court has
held that universities can have a compelling interest in creating a
48
diverse student body (the interest UT invokes here), but strict
scrutiny requires that universities traverse a constitutionally narrow
49
path in pursuit of that interest. This section describes that path and
explains the cases that shaped it.
B. Regents of University of California v. Bakke
The Supreme Court first addressed affirmative action in higher
50
education in Regents of University of California v. Bakke. The
petitioner, a white medical school applicant, challenged the
constitutionality of the University of California at Davis Medical
School’s race-conscious admissions policy, which set aside sixteen slots
51
(out of a class of 100) for minority students. The Court produced six
opinions, none of which was joined by a majority of the Justices.
Justice Powell, writing for himself, concluded that the set-aside was
unconstitutional, but that race could be used as one factor in
admissions decisions, so long as it was considered in the context of an
52
individualized review process. Because the rigid sixteen-person
quota did not allow for this sort of holistic review, Justice Powell
provided a fifth vote to strike it down, and his opinion came to be
53
regarded as controlling.
46. E.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
47. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525–26 (1980) (“The guarantee of equal protection
is ‘universal in [its] application, to all persons . . . without regard to any differences of race,
color, or of nationality.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886))).
48. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). The Supreme Court has also
recognized a compelling interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination. See, e.g.,
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 450. Even though Texas has a well-documented history of de jure
segregation, UT does not aver that it has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of past
discrimination. But see Brief for Amici Curiae NAACP, et al. In Support of Respondents at 23,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Aug. 13, 2012) (arguing that UT has a
compelling interest in remedying the effects of past discrimination in state-funded education).
49. In Grutter, however, that path was considerably wider than is usually permitted under
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Evan Gerstmann & Christopher Shortell, The Many Faces of Strict
Scrutiny: How the Supreme Court Changes the Rules in Race Cases, 72. U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 38–39
(2010) (arguing that “the scrutiny the Court applies to diversity-based affirmative action
programs is quite different from the scrutiny it applies” in other race cases).
50. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
51. Id. at 275.
52. See id. at 318 (Powell, J., concurring) (invalidating the minority set-aside, but noting
that “no such facial infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic background
is simply one element—to be weighted fairly against other elements—in the selection process”).
53. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000); see
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Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke established that universities may
54
use race in order to attain a diverse student body. He reasoned that
the “nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation
55
of many peoples.” But Justice Powell was careful to note that racial
diversity could not be pursued merely for its own sake: “It is not an
interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of
the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected
56
ethnic groups.” The diversity Justice Powell envisioned focused
instead on “a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
57
which race . . . is but a single though important element.”
58

C. Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger

In 2003, the Supreme Court’s twin decisions in Grutter and Gratz
59
v. Bollinger reaffirmed that diversity in higher education is a
60
compelling government interest. In Gratz, the undergraduate
admissions policy at the University of Michigan assigned an automatic
61
twenty points (out of 150 possible points) to minority applicants. The
Court held that this policy was not narrowly tailored, because race
62
was often the decisive factor in admission. The Court reiterated that
race can be used only as one of many factors in a system “flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
63
particular qualifications of each applicant.”
In Grutter, a white applicant claimed that the University of
Michigan Law School denied her application because race was a
also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (endorsing Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke).
54. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (Powell, J., concurring) (concluding that student body
diversity “clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education”).
55. Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id.
58. For excellent discussions of these two cases, see Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Grutter and
Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 459 (2004); Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v.
Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 362–81 (2003).
59. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
60. Id. at 275; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). There is reason to believe,
however, that the diversity rationale for affirmative action policies in education is on shaky
ground. In Parents Involved, four Justices rejected the proposition that diversity is a compelling
interest for state elementary and high schools. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007).
61. 539 U.S. at 255, 275.
62. See id. at 271–72 (finding that race was decisive “for virtually every minimally qualified
underrepresented minority applicant” (citation omitted)).
63. Id. at 271 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., concurring)).
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64

dominant factor in admissions. The Court disagreed, finding that the
law school’s use of race embodied the type of policy of which Justice
Powell spoke so highly in Bakke and therefore was constitutionally
65
permissible. The difference between Grutter and Gratz turned on the
66
extent to which race was used in the context of a holistic review.
The law school’s race-conscious policy, which would later serve as
a model for UT’s, required that admissions staff consider “the ways in
which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the Law
67
School.” This factor was considered along with the applicant’s GPA
and LSAT scores, personal statement, letters of recommendation, and
68
various “soft factors.” Race was not the predominant factor in the
69
admissions decision, but it was “an extremely strong factor.” The law
school did not establish a numerical target for minority enrollment;
rather, it pursued what it called a “critical mass” of minority
students—defined as “a number that encourages underrepresented
minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel
70
isolated.”
71
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court first held that the law school
72
had “a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.”
Because “universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition,” the Court concluded that the law school was free “to make
its own judgments as to . . . the selection of its student body,” absent a
73
showing of bad faith. The Court went on to hold that the law school’s

64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317.
65. Id. at 333–40.
66. Interestingly, seven Justices found no meaningful difference between the two
admissions policies. Only Justices O’Connor and Breyer saw distinguishing characteristics. See
Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT 221, 244 n.104 (2004); cf.
Ian Ayres & Sidney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz,
85 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2007) (arguing that the Gratz policy was actually more narrowly tailored
than the policy in Grutter).
67. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
68. These soft factors included “the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the
undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant’s essay, and the . . . difficulty of
undergraduate course selection.” Id.
69. Id. at 320. An expert witness for Grutter testified at trial that “applicants from
[underrepresented] minority groups are given an extremely large allowance for admission.” Id.
70. Id. at 318. Because the law school required high GPA and LSAT scores for admission,
it claimed it could not reach critical mass without using race as a “plus factor.” See id.
(discussing trial testimony by the law school’s Director of Admissions).
71. Justice O’Connor was careful to point out that “[s]trict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.’” Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 328.
73. Id. at 329 (citations omitted).
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policy was narrowly tailored.
“[S]atisfied that its admissions program . . . [did] not operate as a
74
quota,” the Court found that the law school did not define diversity
“solely in terms of racial and ethnic status,” consistent with the broad
75
view of diversity approved in Bakke. The Court also found that the
law school’s policy endorsed a forward-looking concept of diversity,
focused on the educational benefits flowing therefrom, as opposed to
76
achieving racial balance. And the Court determined that the law
school had given sufficient consideration to race-neutral alternatives
77
before electing to use race. Having satisfied both prongs of strict
scrutiny, the race-conscious admissions policy survived a somewhat
watered-down version of strict scrutiny.
D. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
78
No. 1
After Grutter and Gratz, the Court—in another five-to-four
decision—struck down the use of race in two public school-choice
79
programs on narrow tailoring grounds. Justice Kennedy concurred in
the judgment, but thought the plurality was “too dismissive of the
legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal
80
opportunity regardless of race.” Although Grutter apparently was
81
not controlling in Parents Involved, it became evident that at least
four Justices would have no problem doing away with affirmative
74. Id. at 335 (“Properly understood, a ‘quota’ is a program in which a certain fixed
number or proportion of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.’”
(citations omitted)).
75. Id. at 316, 334–35.
76. Id. at 330.
77. See id. at 339–40 (recognizing that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of
every conceivable race-neutral alternative” but only a “serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the university seeks” (citations
omitted)). The Court also noted that there would be a substantial drop-off in minority
enrollment—from fourteen percent of the student body to only four percent—if the law school
could not consider race directly. See id. at 320.
78. For more in-depth discussions of this case, see Maria Funk Miles, Confusing Means
With Ends: How the Ninth Circuit Continues the Tradition of Mistaking Diversity As An Ends in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. &
L.J. 245 (2005) (discussing the lower court opinions); Michelle Renee Shamblin, Silencing
Chicken Little: Options for School Districts After Parents Involved, 69 LA. L. REV. 219 (2008).
79. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 726 (2007). For
a good discussion of the relation between Parents Involved and affirmative action in higher
education, see generally Andrew LeGrand, Narrowing the Tailoring: How Parents Involved
Limits the Use of Race in Higher Education Admissions, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 53 (2009).
80. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 725 (majority opinion) (“The present cases are not governed by Grutter.”).
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82

action in education. Thus, the future of race-conscious admissions at
UT—and perhaps affirmative action in general—will likely rest with
83
Justice Kennedy.
IV. HOLDING
On January 18, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
84
85
Circuit affirmed a district court holding that UT’s use of race in
86
admissions was constitutional. Like the district court, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that UT’s policy was essentially modeled on the
one the Supreme Court approved in Grutter, and therefore must fall
87
within that case’s rule. The more difficult question—addressed by
both courts—was whether the Top Ten Percent Law, which has by
itself a substantial effect on minority enrollment, renders UT’s

82. See id. at 748 (plurality opinion) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).
83. See infra notes 137–141 and accompanying text (noting that, since Grutter, Justice
Kennedy has replaced Justice O’Connor as the swing vote in affirmative action cases). See
generally Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937 (2008) (discussing the
importance of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved to the future of affirmative
action in higher education); Kimberly A. Pacelli, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin:
Navigating the Narrows Between Grutter and Parents Involved, 63 ME. L. REV. 569 (2011)
(discussing how Parents Involved might inform the Court’s application of Grutter to the present
case).
84. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-3345).
85. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 613 (W.D. Tex. 2009),
aff’d, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
86. Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 247. (“[A]s long as Grutter remains good law, UT’s current
admissions program remains constitutional.”). This case produced two concurring opinions.
Judge King concurred fully in the judgment and in the Grutter analysis discussed above, but
declined to join Judge Higginbotham’s discussion of the Top Ten Percent Law. Id. at 247 (King,
J., concurring). Judge Higginbotham observed that the Top Ten Percent Law, although
technically race-neutral, does not leave room for the use of race in the context of a holistic
review and “is at best a blunt tool for securing the educational benefits that diversity is intended
to achieve.” Id. at 238–42 (majority opinion). Because “[n]o party challenged . . . the validity or
wisdom of the Top Ten Percent Law,” Judge King did not join that part of Judge
Higginbotham’s opinion. Id. at 247 (King, J., concurring). Judge Garza, in a lengthy opinion,
agreed that UT’s admissions policy was constitutional under Grutter, but wrote separately to
advocate that Grutter itself was unconstitutional and should be overruled. Id. (Garza, J.,
concurring); see also Joshua Thompson, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin: Could the
Supreme Court Revisit Its Decision in Grutter?, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GRPS.
57, 59–60 (2011) (summarizing Judge Garza’s concurrence).
87. See Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (“[T]he Court has difficulty imagining an
admissions policy that could more closely resemble the Michigan Law School’s admissions
policy upheld . . . by the Supreme Court in Grutter.”); Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 243 (referring to
UT’s policy as “a Grutter-style admissions system”).
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explicit consideration of race constitutionally infirm.
The Fifth Circuit began by outlining the appropriate standard of
89
review. Adhering to well-established precedent, the court subjected
90
UT’s use of race to strict scrutiny. The court invoked Grutter for the
proposition that educational institutions are entitled to “a degree of
deference to [their] academic decisions,” such as whether and how to
91
factor race into admission decisions. The court went on to determine
that such deference applies not only to whether UT has a compelling
interest in using race, but also to the means by which it chooses to
92
pursue that interest. Armed with this especially deferential form of
strict scrutiny, the court undertook an evaluation of UT’s race93
conscious admissions policy.
The court first concluded that UT’s policy, contrary to Fisher’s
94
assertion, did not amount to racial balancing. The court found that
UT was not using race simply to match student body demographics to
those in the State of Texas, but rather in pursuit of the educational
95
benefits of diversity. Although racial balancing cannot be the end
goal of an admissions scheme, “[s]ome attention to numbers, without
more, does not transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid
96
quota.” It follows then that UT may consider Texas demographics—
but only to discern which minorities are underrepresented. Because
UT did no more than that, its plan did not amount to unconstitutional
97
racial balancing.

88. See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 243 (noting that the Top Ten Percent Law “places at risk
UT’s race-conscious admissions policies”).
89. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
90. Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 231 (“It is a given that as UT’s Grutter-like admissions program
differentiates between applicants on the basis of race, it is subject to strict scrutiny . . . .”).
91. Id. at 232.
92. Id. (“That is, the narrow-tailoring inquiry—like the compelling-interest inquiry—is
undertaken with a degree of deference to [UT’s] constitutionally protected, presumably expert
academic judgment.”).
93. See id. at 234 (applying strict scrutiny while “mindful of a university’s academic
freedom and the complex educational judgments made when assembling a broadly diverse
student body”).
94. Id. at 238 (“[UT] adhered to Grutter when it reintroduced race into its admissions
process based in part on an analysis that devoted special attention to those minorities which
were significantly underrepresented on its campus.”).
95. See id. at 236–37 (“UT properly concluded that these individuals from the state’s
underrepresented minorities would be most likely to add unique perspectives that are otherwise
absent from its classrooms.”).
96. Id. at 235 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003)).
97. See id. at 238 (“Although a university must eschew demographic targets, it need not be
blind to significant racial disparities in its community, nor is it wholly prohibited from taking the
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In deferring to “UT’s considered, good faith” judgment, the court
next rejected Fisher’s contention that UT had already achieved a
critical mass of minority students on campus when it adopted its
98
current policy. Although UT had in fact achieved impressive levels
99
of diversity prior to reintroducing race as a factor in admissions, the
court found that “social changes” in Texas supported UT’s apparent
conclusion that critical mass means something different today than it
100
did then. Finding support in Grutter, the court went on to note that
critical mass refers to diversity as opposed to mere numbers, making
Fisher’s attempt to define critical mass in numerical terms
101
unavailing. The court determined that seemingly adequate levels of
minority enrollment might not reflect the “true level of diverse
102
interaction” at UT and thus might be a poor proxy for critical mass.
Lastly, the court held that small gains in minority enrollment
attributable to race-conscious policies did not themselves present
constitutional problems, nor did they belie UT’s “good faith
103
conclusion” that critical mass had not yet been achieved.

degree of disparity into account.”).
98. Id. at 244 (citations omitted); see also id. at 242–43 (outlining Fisher’s arguments). Its
ruling in favor of UT notwithstanding, the court was obviously concerned about the Top Ten
Percent Law’s substantial effect on minority enrollment. See id. at 245 (noting that “UT’s claim
that it has not yet achieved critical mass is less convincing when viewed against the backdrop of
the Top Ten Percent Law”). Nevertheless, it recognized that the Top Ten Percent Law, standing
alone, would not include the type of individualized review necessary to achieve a student body
that is diverse, not only racially, but in myriad other ways. Consequently, the court reasoned
that UT could supplement the Top Ten Percent Law by considering race directly. See id. at 239
(citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340).
99. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
100. See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 244 (“[W]hatever levels of minority enrollment sufficed more
than a decade ago may no longer constitute critical mass today, given the social changes Texas
has undergone during the intervening years.”).
101. See id. (“Grutter pointedly refused to tie the concept of ‘critical mass’ to any fixed
number. The Grutter Court approved of the . . . goal of attaining critical mass even though the
school had specifically abjured any numerical target.” (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318)).
102. See id. at 245 (discussing UT’s “appropriate consideration [of] whether aggregate
minority enrollment is translating into adequate diversity in the classroom”).
103. See id. at 246 (“The [Grutter] Court did not hold that a Grutter-like system would be
impermissible even after race-neutral alternatives have been exhausted because the gains are
small.”). Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (approving of race-conscious policies that produce small gains,
so long as race is part of a “nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student
characteristics”), with id. (“[T]he small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools
could have achieved their stated ends through other means.”).
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V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
Fisher’s overarching contention is that UT’s use of race in
104
admission decisions violates the Equal Protection Clause. She first
alleges that “[n]either of UT’s justifications for restoring race to its
105
admission system is a constitutionally compelling state interest.”
Fisher contends that UT engages in constitutionally proscribed “racial
balancing” by “using race in admissions to mirror the demographics of
106
Texas.” UT’s goal (so the argument goes) is not racial diversity for
the sake of educational benefits—the only interest recognized as
107
compelling in Grutter—and therefore is constitutionally deficient.
Fisher goes on to argue that UT’s interest in achieving “classroom
diversity” is outside the scope of Grutter’s recognized interest. Under
Grutter, a university may seek to enroll a critical mass of minority
students as a percentage of the total student body but not “major-by108
major and classroom-by-classroom.”
Moving to the second prong of strict scrutiny, Fisher contends that
even if UT can articulate a compelling interest for using race, the
means by which it seeks to achieve its goal of racial diversity is not
narrowly tailored, for several reasons. First, UT’s race-conscious
admissions policy is not narrowly tailored because it has too small of
109
an impact on minority enrollment.
Second, “UT’s admissions system could never achieve ‘classroom
110
diversity’ through constitutional means.” In order to diversify the
classroom, UT would have to make race a dominant factor in either
admissions or major selection, both of which would be clearly
unconstitutional, given that race cannot be more than a minor factor
111
considered in the context of a holistic review.
Third, “[e]ven if UT has a compelling interest in proportional
representation based on Texas demographics . . . such a goal could not
112
possibly be implemented in a narrowly tailored way.” To achieve
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 24.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 45.
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such racial balance would require implementing different targets for
each minority group and such a practice would lead to more
discrimination based on race—this time among the various minority
113
groups.
Fisher next argues that the Fifth Circuit turned conventional strict
scrutiny analysis on its head by showing too much deference to UT’s
race-conscious policies. Under Grutter, a university is entitled to a
degree of deference to its decision that it has a compelling interest in
achieving racial diversity. But, as Fisher points out, “that is about as
114
far as deference should go.” To defer to UT’s judgment that its raceconscious system is narrowly tailored is to abandon the essence of
strict scrutiny.
Finally, Fisher proposes that the Court either clarify or overrule
115
Grutter. In effect, Fisher argues that Grutter and strict scrutiny are
incompatible, and, unless the Court elects to substantially revamp
116
Grutter, one of them must go.
B. Respondent’s Arguments
UT begins by arguing that its race-conscious admissions policy
“exemplifies the type of plan” that the Supreme Court approved in
117
Grutter. Implicit in this argument is that if affirmative action in
higher education is to survive as a matter of constitutional law, so
must UT’s admissions policy.
After pointing out that Fisher cannot “challenge the
118
individualized nature of UT’s consideration of race,” UT attacks
Fisher’s arguments for the admissions policy’s unconstitutionality.
First, UT argues that its policy is not tantamount to “racial balancing,”
because in the past the Court has found racial balancing only where
119
the policy set a racial quota tied to demographics. Although Fisher
contends that “mirror[ing] the demographics of Texas” is “UT’s
120
acknowledged goal,” UT disagrees. It claims it has not established a
racial quota, so its admissions policy cannot amount to racial
113.
114.
115.
116.
53–56.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 53.
Fisher refers multiple times to the Grutter standard as “unworkable.” See, e.g., id. at
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 19.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 5, at 19.
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121

balancing. Grutter does not foreclose UT’s ability to consider state
demographics, so long as it does not work backward to achieve a
122
racial target based on those demographics.
Second, that a substantial majority of applicants are admitted
under the Top Ten Percent Law does not prohibit UT from
123
considering race in the context of a “holistic review process.”
According to UT, the Top Ten Percent Law does not permit the type
of individualized review necessary to achieve diversity within
underrepresented minority groups and thus is not a race-neutral
124
alternative that works “about as well.” UT concludes that to adopt
Fisher’s position would preclude the very type of individualized
review that the Court found so important in Bakke and Grutter.
Third, UT attacks Fisher’s assertion that UT’s admissions system
is not narrowly tailored because it has too small an effect on minority
enrollment. As UT puts it, “the modest manner in which race may
125
impact holistic admissions is a constitutional virtue, not a vice.” UT
argues that it would be strange if its race-conscious plan could be
126
unconstitutional because race was not given enough weight. UT
further asserts that its nuanced consideration of race is important “to
assembl[ing] a student body that is broadly diverse—including within
127
different minority groups.” In other words, just because UT’s
modest use of race does not account for a substantial increase in
minority enrollment does not mean that it fails to account for a
substantial increase in student body diversity.

121. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 39, at 28. UT does admit that it considers Texas
demographics when determining which minorities are underrepresented, but points out that
“some attention to numbers” does not “transform a flexible admissions system into a rigid
quota.” Id.
122. See id. at 29 (averring that UT does not engage in racial balancing because it has not
established a “goal, target, or other quantitative objective” for minority admissions).
123. See id. at 31–32 (“Indeed, in Grutter this Court specifically rejected the argument that
percentage plans are a complete, workable, and constitutionally required alternative to the
individualized consideration of race in holistic review.” (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 339–40 (2003))).
124. See id. at 33–35 (“[For example], the [black] or Hispanic child of successful
professionals in Dallas who has strong SAT scores and has demonstrated leadership ability in
extracurricular activities but falls in the second decile of his or her high school class . . . cannot
be admitted under the top 10% law.”).
125. Id. at 36.
126. See id. (pointing out the inherently flawed nature of Fisher’s assertion that “UT’s
consideration of race in holistic admissions is too modest to pass muster”).
127. Id. at 33.
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Fourth, a paucity of classroom diversity is evidence that UT has
not yet attained a critical mass. UT asserts that its “objective was the
educational benefits of a richly diverse student body—the very
128
interest held compelling in . . . Grutter.” Because diverse interactions
leading to educational benefits mostly occur in the classroom, UT
argues that it may focus on achieving more diversity in particular
classes without running afoul of Grutter or the Constitution.
Fifth, UT maintains that the Fifth Circuit did not abandon strict
129
scrutiny in its review of UT’s admissions policy. UT agrees with
Fisher that “[a] university does not get deference on the ultimate
question whether the means through which it pursues its compelling
130
interest are narrowly tailored,” but argues that the Fifth Circuit gave
no such deference.
UT ends with a brief discussion of reasons the Court should
refrain from overruling Grutter, and observes that the doctrine of
stare decisis counsels against overruling such an important decision,
131
decided less than a decade ago.
VI. ANALYSIS
Abigail Fisher’s challenge invites the Supreme Court to clean up
its affirmative action jurisprudence by producing a more workable
standard concerning when and how race can be used as a factor in
university admissions. Before deciding the fate of UT’s policy, the
Court will probably discuss whether diversity remains a compelling
interest in higher education, the degree of deference universities
should receive in the adoption and implementation of race-conscious
polices, and the precise requirements of narrow tailoring. When the
dust settles, a majority of the Court will probably have found a way to
invalidate UT’s policy by substantially recalibrating the analysis in
Grutter. Nevertheless, this case probably will not be the death of
affirmative action, and Grutter (albeit with a different look) is likely
to survive as binding precedent. But going forward, university
affirmative action programs might have to find a way to withstand a

128. See id. at 21 (highlighting the “stark racial isolation in [UT] classrooms”).
129. Id. at 21, 47.
130. Id. at 48.
131. Id. at 51–53; cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)
(noting that reexamination of precedent involves, inter alia, an inquiry into “whether facts have
so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification”).
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form of judicial review that is tantamount to “strict in theory, but fatal
132
in fact.”
A. Revamping the Grutter Analysis
1. Diversity as a Compelling Interest
As a threshold matter, if UT’s policy is to have any chance of
survival, the Supreme Court will have to reaffirm that diversity is a
compelling interest that a university may pursue. Because there do
133
not seem to be enough votes in support of the alternate view, the
foundation of Grutter and Bakke probably will remain intact. The
Court is likely, however, to cabin the compelling interest to the
pursuit of student body diversity, as opposed to diversity in the
classroom. To hold otherwise would permit a university to use race in
admissions indefinitely—until “educators [can] certif[y] that the
elusive critical mass ha[s] finally been attained, not merely in the
student body generally, but major-by-major and classroom-by134
classroom.”
2. Deference and Strict Scrutiny
Under Grutter’s deferential treatment of university decisionmaking, establishing a compelling interest in diversity was practically
a formality, and as evidenced by the Fifth Circuit decision, such
135
deference has carried over to the narrow tailoring inquiry. This
probably will not be true after Fisher. The Court will likely recast the
deferential standard it adopted in Grutter by bringing both the
compelling interest and narrow tailoring analyses closer in line with
conventional strict scrutiny. Consequently, a university may no longer
be afforded ample deference in determining whether it has reached a

132. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e wish to dispel
the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” (citation omitted)).
133. Assuming the “liberal” wing of the Court votes as expected, ending diversity’s tenure
as a compelling government interest would require Justice Kennedy’s vote. Although Justice
Kennedy has never voted to uphold an affirmative action policy, he has consistently endorsed
the notion that a university’s interest in diversity can, in some instances, be compelling. See, e.g.,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). There is no
reason to think he will change his mind in this case.
134. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 254 (5th Cir. 2011)
(Garza, J., concurring) (“Allowing race-based social engineering at the university level is one
thing, but not nearly as invasive as condoning it at the classroom level.”), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-3345).
135. See id. at 232 (majority opinion).
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136

critical mass of minority enrollment. In addition, the Court will
likely make clear that whatever minimal deference applies to the
compelling interest analysis does not apply to the narrow tailoring
prong.
Perhaps the most important difference between Grutter and
Fisher is that Justice Kennedy now occupies Justice O’Connor’s
former seat as the swing Justice in affirmative action cases. Justice
O’Connor, in her majority opinion in Grutter, was content to defer to
Michigan Law School on several fronts: whether it had enrolled a
137
critical mass of minority students, whether it had appropriately
138
considered race-neutral alternatives,
and whether it “w[ould]
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
139
practicable.” Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, dissented in
Grutter precisely because he thought that the majority “refuse[d] to
be faithful to the settled principle of strict review designed to reflect
140
[important] concerns.” His vote could allow the Fisher Court to
141
rewrite the deferential standard espoused in prior cases.
If such a revision does occur, the Court probably will start by
embracing the idea that deference, even at the compelling interest
stage, cannot coexist with strict scrutiny. This seems a simple
proposition at first glance, but the Court will have to find a way
around the fact that universities, for First Amendment reasons, must
be afforded some level of deference in creating the type of student
142
body that best fosters their educational objectives. This would

136. Notably, several Justices at oral argument seemed hostile to the idea of critical mass,
intimating that it is virtually indistinguishable from a quota. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral
Argument at 45, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012)
(Roberts, C.J.) (“[Y]ou won’t tell me what the critical mass is. How am I supposed to do the job
that our precedents say I should do?”). Although Grutter recognized the distinction, 539 U.S. at
335–36, it is conceivable that the Court could scrap the critical mass concept in favor of a more
useful analytical tool. Cf. Terrell, supra note 7, at 234 (criticizing critical mass).
137. Grutter, 539 U.S at 329–30.
138. Id. at 340, 343.
139. Id. at 343.
140. See id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Notably, Justice Kennedy seems to accept
Grutter-level deference “to a university’s definition of its educational objective.” See id.
However, because he is a strong proponent of rigorous judicial review when racial classifications
are at issue, he will likely not object to a decision that removes some of the deferential gloss
from the compelling interest analysis.
141. Cf., Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49
HOW. L.J. 241, 248 (2006) (discussing the “more flexible, contextualized version of strict
scrutiny” embraced in Grutter).
142. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–14 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes
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require squaring deference to a university’s educational decisions
with strict scrutiny review, which requires more than a good faith
143
assurance that the explicit use of race is necessary. Under Grutter’s
overly deferential standard, it is virtually impossible for courts to
ensure that a university’s nebulous claim of insufficient diversity is
not pretextual. After Fisher, by contrast, future courts probably will
be forced to evaluate rigorously whether a university actually needs
more diversity in order to attain the educational benefits that flow
therefrom (as opposed to simply taking the university at its word),
even before reaching the question of whether the particular policy at
issue is narrowly tailored.
3. Narrow Tailoring
Any deference the Court is willing to grant UT at the compelling
interest stage almost certainly will stop there. While Grutter said that
“[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable
144
race-neutral alternative,” the Fisher Court may hold that racial
145
classifications can be employed only as “a last resort.” The last
resort inquiry would entail a thorough examination of possible raceneutral alternatives, require empirical evidence showing that race is
not a dominant admissions factor, and look unfavorably upon raceconscious policies that have only a small effect on minority
enrollment.

the selection of its student body.”). A burden-shifting analysis, like the following, could help
balance these competing standards. A university’s assertion that it needs a more diverse student
body (i.e., that it has not yet reached critical mass) would create a rebuttable presumption that it
has established a compelling interest in pursuing that goal. An applicant-plaintiff could rebut
that presumption with evidence showing that the university can achieve the educational benefits
of diversity without using race as a factor in admissions. If the applicant-plaintiff succeeds, the
burden would then fall on the university to identify specific educational goals it would achieve
by increasing student body diversity through the use of racial preferences. Upon such a showing,
a university will have established its compelling interest in creating a more diverse student body.
All that would be left is an inquiry into whether the policy the university chose to adopt is
narrowly tailored.
143. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989) (“The history of racial
classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to . . . pronouncements of
necessity has no place in equal protection analysis.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at
49, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012) (Sotomayor, J.)
(“[W]hen do we stop deferring to the University’s judgment that race is still necessary? That’s
the bottom line of this case.”).
144. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
145. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]ndividual racial classifications employed in this manner may be
considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest.”).
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After Fisher, narrow tailoring could require not only
consideration, but attempted implementation of race-neutral
alternatives. These alternatives may not be identical for each
institution of higher education, depending on its educational mission;
but virtually any university will need to have exhausted certain
alternatives—like targeted scholarship programs, focused marketing
146
campaigns, and using race-neutral criteria as proxies for race —
before resorting to racial classifications. As part of this analysis, the
Court will want to consider the administrative burden a university
147
might be forced to shoulder in enacting race-neutral policies. Unlike
Grutter, however, Fisher will likely mandate a showing that all
practical race-neutral alternatives failed in attaining adequate
diversity before permitting the resort to racial classifications.
In response to Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter, the Court
might also elect to be more skeptical when a university claims that
race is only a minor factor in the admission decision. Justice Kennedy,
in voting to invalidate Michigan Law School’s race-conscious policy,
was concerned that the “Law School made no effort to guard against
148
[the] danger” of race “becom[ing] divorced from individual review.”
He premised this conclusion on the law school’s insistence on tracking
minority enrollment throughout the admissions cycle, which he
thought made race a decisive factor in many admission decisions
149
towards the end of the cycle. In order to guarantee that race never
becomes too dominant a factor in admissions, the Court could
conclude that tracking the racial composition of the incoming class,
when paired with an admissions policy in which race is considered, is a
per se violation of the narrow tailoring requirement. Under this
standard, a university would have to show that it does not “keep
ongoing tallies of racial or ethnic composition of [its] entering

146. Cf. id. at 789 (suggesting other race-neutral means by which an educational institution
“may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds”).
147. Of course, universities would not be required to implement particularly burdensome
race-neutral polices just to “try them out.” A graduate or professional school, for example,
would probably not be required to enact a percentage plan, which may be a workable raceneutral alternative only for an undergraduate state institution. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340
(indicating that the law school is not expected to adopt race-neutral alternatives that would
effectively compromise its educational integrity and/or alter the inherent nature of the
institution).
148. Id. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 392–93 (expressing concern that the law school provided no safeguard against
the admissions officers’ use of “the [daily] reports to recalibrate the plus factor given to race
depending on how close they were to achieving the Law School’s goal of critical mass”).
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150

students,” and it would be required to identify sufficient safeguards
that protect against an applicant’s race being given too much
151
weight. The practical upshot would be that university race-conscious
admissions policies would have to be more transparent than was
necessary under Grutter.
Finally, the Court could further heighten the narrow tailoring
standard by concluding that gains in minority enrollment resulting
from race-conscious policies must be large enough to warrant the use
152
of race—”a highly suspect tool.” Although this reasoning was
implicit in Grutter, the Court did not expressly endorse a cost-benefit
analysis in that decision. In Parents Involved, however, the Court
153
hinted that this reasoning was legitimate. Fleshed out, the rationale
would look like this: Because there is great inherent cost in treating
persons differently based on their race, the benefits resulting from
such disparate treatment must be at least equally great. How the
Court will decide when the effect of race is neither too small nor too
large is difficult to predict. It could find that narrow tailoring now
154
requires that race (1) be used in the context of individualized review
and (2) effectuate more than a negligible increase in minority
enrollment. Although the second requirement begs the initial
question (by merely substituting one subjective determinate for
another—“negligible” for “too small”), it comports with strict scrutiny
by ensuring that race is being used only to the extent necessary to
achieve meaningful increases in diversity, as opposed to being used

150. Id. Tracking the racial composition of the incoming class creates a significant risk that,
until critical mass is attained, race will be given increasingly greater weight as the end of the
admissions cycle approaches. Requiring that universities wait until the end of the cycle to
evaluate the racial makeup of the incoming class would allow courts to ensure that a university
is not pursuing race-based numerical targets under the guise of a holistic review system. If
admissions officers do not know how many minority applicants have been admitted, there would
be no reason for the weight given to race to change as the cycle wanes.
151. As a practical matter, this may require admissions data showing significant yearly
fluctuation in minority enrollment that does not correlate directly with yearly fluctuation in the
percentage of underrepresented minorities in the applicant pool. A consistent pattern of
minority enrollment that falls within a tight range over a multiple-year span suggests that the
university may be pursuing race-based numerical targets. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 384–85
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
152. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
153. The Court suggested that the “minimal impact” of racial classifications could “cast
doubt on [their] necessity,” and noted that “[i]n Grutter, the consideration of race was viewed as
indispensible in more than tripling minority representation.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734–35 (2007).
154. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (highlighting the importance of the
individualized review requirement).
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for some other, more insidious reason.
In short, after Fisher, a university that wants to factor race into
admissions will probably have to (1) present tangible evidence that it
had not reached a critical mass prior to implementing a raceconscious policy; (2) show that it tried every practical race-neutral
alternative before resorting to racial classifications; (3) prevent
admissions staff from ever knowing the racial composition of the class
prior to the end of the admissions cycle; (4) ensure that race is given
just the right amount of weight; and (5) guarantee that its raceconscious policy will continue only for as long as is absolutely
155
necessary.
B. Application to UT’s Admissions Policy
Armed with a considerably less-deferential standard of review, the
Court probably will invalidate UT’s use of race in admissions on
narrow tailoring grounds. Although the Court might not be willing to
defer completely to UT’s assertion that it cannot achieve all the
educational benefits of diversity at current diversity levels, it will
likely be satisfied that UT has done enough to establish a compelling
interest in pursuing diversity. The Court could rely, for example, on
two studies UT commissioned in 2003, both of which showed that
156
contemporaneous diversity levels were insufficient. That would
seem to be enough to pass constitutional muster, even under a lessdeferential standard. The decision is well within UT’s “expert
157
academic judgment” and moreover is supported with tangible
evidence. By pointing to the two studies, the Court can say it is
applying strict scrutiny while still acknowledging that universities
receive special treatment under the First Amendment. Because UT’s
policy probably will not survive the narrow tailoring inquiry, it will not
be necessary for the Court to spend much time here.
The Court could decide that UT’s policy is not narrowly tailored
for several reasons. It could hold, for example, that UT has not met its
burden of showing that it tried all practical race-neutral alternatives

155. The Grutter Court made clear that race-concious admissions policies, in order to be
constitutional, must include “sunset provisions.” See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[A]ll
governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”).
156. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 631 F.3d 213, 225 (5th Cir. 2011)
(noting that the study found that ninety percent of these smaller classes had either one or zero
black students), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-3345).
157. Id. at 232.
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before adopting its current race-conscious policy. By trotting out a
laundry list of suggestions, the Court could simply say, “try these first.”
The Court could hold that the Top Ten Percent Law yields sufficient
numbers of minority students each year and therefore precludes UT
from experimenting with race-conscious policies. The Court could
hold that UT must, at the very least, be able to show the precise effect
of its use of race on enrollment numbers, and that its failure in this
158
regard is detrimental to the claim that its policy is narrowly tailored.
These possibilities notwithstanding, the Court is likely to focus on the
fact that UT’s race-conscious admissions policy has produced only a
small increase in minority enrollment.
As discussed above, the Court will likely emphasize that narrow
159
tailoring is “about balancing constitutional costs and benefits.” UT’s
use of race may only be a small factor in a system that epitomizes
individualized review, but race still has to make more than a negligible
difference in minority enrollment, given the inherent cost associated
with race-based preferences. UT’s pre-Grutter admissions policy
160
produced a class that was 21.4% black and Hispanic. It is true that
161
minority enrollment had reached 25.5% by the time Abigail Fisher
applied, but all of that increase cannot definitively be attributed to the
162
explicit use of race. Judge Garza estimated that, in the year Fisher
applied, the number of minority applicants admitted because of race
163
was probably not more than one percent of the incoming class.
Consequently, the Court could conclude that UT’s use of race does
not contribute to any meaningful educational benefits that cannot be
achieved at current diversity levels, and therefore fails the narrow
tailoring test.
In Grutter, the law school’s use of race boosted minority
164
enrollment from four percent to fourteen percent. Race was used in
the context of a holistic review, and the increases wrought in minority
enrollment contributed in a significant way to diverse interaction on
158. See id. at 252–53 (Garza, J., concurring) (“[W]ithout the ability to measure the number
of ‘but-for’ admits . . . , courts cannot meaningfully evaluate whether a university’s use of race
fits its asserted interest narrowly.” (citations omitted)).
159. Id. at 263.
160. Id. at 224 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at 226.
162. See id. (“Because of the myriad programs instituted, it can be difficult to attribute
increases in minority enrollment to any one initiative.”).
163. See id. at 259–62 (Garza, J., concurring) (discussing UT admissions data supporting
that estimation).
164. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003).
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campus. It seems that UT, by contrast, cannot credibly argue that
enrolling approximately 200 more minority students (assuming,
unrealistically, that race was the “but for” cause of admission for all of
these applicants) in a class of over 6,000 is tied to any discernible
educational benefit. And even if it could, there is no reason to think
the same small increase in racial diversity could not be achieved
through race-neutral means.
VII. CONCLUSION
What specific educational benefits of diversity does the student
body lack? How does the increase in minority enrollment resulting
from a race-conscious admissions policy produce such benefits? And
why could those benefits not be achieved through race-neutral
means? In asking these (or similar) questions, the Court could recast
Grutter by requiring a closer fit, not just between diversity and the
means by which it is pursued, but between diversity and its purported
educational benefits. Since Bakke, it has been axiomatic that racial
diversity cannot be pursued for its own sake; it must be tied to the
academic good that justifies racial classifications in higher
165
education. The Court will probably hold that UT’s race-conscious
system conflicts with this principle and therefore violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
In deciding Fisher, the Court likely will put to rest, at least for
now, doubts surrounding the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative
action. But after Fisher, the explicit use of race in university
admissions, like abortion after Casey, may be subject to a new, more
stringent set of rules.

165. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).

